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abstract: Good decision making is important for the survival and
fitness of stakeholders, but decisions usually involve uncertainty and
conflict. We know surprisingly little about profitable decision-making
strategies in conflict situations. On the one hand, sharing decisions
with others can pool information and decrease uncertainty (swarm
intelligence). On the other hand, sharing decisions can hand influence
to individuals whose goals conflict. Thus, when should an animal
share decisions with others? Using a theoretical model, we show that,
contrary to intuition, decision sharing by animals with conflicting
goals often increases individual gains as well as decision accuracy.
Thus, conflict—far from hampering effective decision making—can
improve decision outcomes for all stakeholders, as long as they share
large-scale goals. In contrast, decisions shared by animals without
conflict were often surprisingly poor. The underlying mechanism is
that animals with conflicting goals are less correlated in individual
choice errors. These results provide a strong argument in the interest
of all stakeholders for not excluding other (e.g., minority) factions
from collective decisions. The observed benefits of including diverse
factions among the decision makers could also be relevant to human
collective decision making.
Keywords: collective behavior, conflict resolution, cooperation, quo-
rum decision, shared decision, social choice.
Introduction
From insects to mammals, animals that live in groups need
to make vital decisions collectively (Conradt and Roper
2005). Group members have to decide together about
communal nesting sites; communal activities; when and
where to forage, shelter, or rest; communal migration
routes; and communal enterprises (Seeley and Buhrman
1999; Ame et al. 2006; Biro et al. 2006; Kerth et al. 2006;
Ballerini et al. 2008; Petit et al. 2009; Ramseyer et al. 2009;
Kerth 2010; Nagy et al. 2010; McComb et al. 2011; Pyritz
et al. 2011; Sueur et al. 2011). Often, outcomes of collective
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decisions have important implications with respect to in-
dividual survival, fitness, and group cohesion and can even
shape the social organization of a species (Krause and
Ruxton 2002; Ruckstuhl and Neuhaus 2002). Thus, suc-
cessful group living requires the ability to make good col-
lective decisions.
Good decisions often require good information. How-
ever, decisions usually involve large uncertainties (Codling
et al. 2007; List et al. 2009; Sumpter and Pratt 2009; Krause
et al. 2010; Ward et al. 2011). That is, no single animal
holds all the decision-relevant information, and personal
information can contain errors. In such situations, by shar-
ing the decision making (e.g., through majority vote), sev-
eral decision makers can pool their personal information
and eliminate individual errors, often resulting in better
informed decision outcomes (List 2004; Couzin et al. 2005,
2011; Hastie and Kameda 2005; Krause et al. 2010). This
wisdom of the crowd (in humans) or swarm intelligence
(in other animals) is an important phenomenon that is
utilized by stock markets, betting agents, and web search
engines and, in animals, by house-hunting insect swarms,
predator-avoiding fish shoals, and migrating bird flocks
(Seeley and Buhrman 1999; Biro et al. 2006; List et al.
2009; Krause et al. 2010; Ward et al. 2011).
In addition to information uncertainty, collective deci-
sions often involve conflicting personal goals. That is, in-
dividual stakeholders in the decision often disagree, in prin-
ciple, as to what would constitute a desirable decision
outcome (Conradt and Roper 2003, 2007, 2009; King et al.
2008; Conradt et al. 2009; Hix et al. 2009; Bousquet and
Manser 2011). For example, hungry animals often prefer
different communal activities than do well-fed group mem-
bers, and small vulnerable animals have other priorities in
communal enterprises than do larger animals (Clutton-
Brock et al. 1982; Krause et al. 1992; Prins 1996; Ruckstuhl
and Neuhaus 2002; King et al. 2008; Lingle et al. 2008).
Such conflicting personal goals can have important survival
and fitness implications (Conradt and Roper 2005).
Conflicting personal goals might influence the manner
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Box 1: Large-scale goal agreement in
conjunction with small-scale goal conflict
We considered only animals that live in relatively stable groups
(Krause and Ruxton 2002; Kerth 2010). These frequently make
collective decisions about issues that matter for fitness and survival
(Conradt and Roper 2003). Members of any such group typically
share large-scale goals since they would otherwise not live socially
(Krause and Ruxton 2002). For example, in migration decisions,
all animals prefer to use routes that lead to a communal viable
destination over routes that do not; in foraging decisions, all prefer
to visit foraging patches that yield at least some food; in decisions
about collective activities, all animals prefer those that lead to
success of the communal enterprise over those that do not (Clut-
ton-Brock et al. 1982; Creel and Creel 1995; Biro et al. 2006; Nagy
et al. 2010; McComb et al. 2011). However, at the same time,
individual animals within a group often differ in their goals with
respect to smaller-scale issues, depending on their personal needs
(Ruckstuhl and Neuhaus 2002; Conradt and Roper 2003, 2005,
2007). For example, when faced with a choice between different
migration routes that all lead to a viable destination, vulnerable
animals often prefer the safest route, while others might prefer
the shortest one; if there is a choice between different foraging
patches that each yield food, smaller animals often prefer a patch
with a higher forage quality and larger animals one with a higher
forage quantity; or in a choice of collective activities, animals in
different physiological states often have different priorities and
risk aversity (e.g., Clutton-Brock et al. 1982; Ruckstuhl and Neu-
haus 2002; King et al. 2008; Lingle et al. 2008; Nagy et al. 2010).
Thus, if there are conflicts, then most commonly they take the
form of large-scale goal agreement in conjunction with small-
scale goal conflict in social (but noneusocial) species (Conradt
and Roper 2005). We have developed a decision model that cap-
tures this typical conflict structure of noneusocial species.
with which individuals treat and use the information pro-
vided by others, so that, in situations with conflict, the
sharing of decision making could have disadvantages as
well as advantages to an individual. This is because de-
cision sharing might pool information that is biased and,
in particular, because it could hand influence of the de-
cision outcome to others whose personal goals differ from
the individual’s own personal goals (Austen-Smith and
Feddersen 2009; Schulte 2010; Conradt 2012). Thus, con-
flicting goals and information uncertainty are likely to
interact to shape the decision-making strategies of indi-
viduals and, hence, the resulting group behavior (Austen-
Smith and Feddersen 2009; Schulte 2010; see also app. B,
available online). Consequently, we need to look at the
influence of uncertainty and conflict on individual strat-
egies concurrently in order to properly understand col-
lective decision-making strategies.
While a huge body of research in a wide range of dis-
ciplines looks at collective decisions in situations with in-
formation uncertainty (e.g., Gigerenzer and Goldstein
1996; Couzin et al. 2005, 2011; Lusseau and Conradt 2009;
Marshall et al. 2009; Moussaid et al. 2009; Sumpter and
Pratt 2009; Katsikopoulos and King 2010; Krause et al.
2010) or in situations with conflicting goals (e.g., Conradt
and Roper 2003, 2007, 2009; Rands et al. 2003; Kerth et
al. 2006; Dostalkova and Spinka 2007; King et al. 2008;
Conradt et al. 2009; Petit et al. 2009; Bousquet and Manser
2011), surprisingly few studies in biology have looked at
both factors concurrently (Schulte 2010; Conradt 2012;
for a detailed review, see “Discussion”).
In this study, we ask what are, in principle, profitable
(adaptive) decision-making strategies in collective deci-
sions that involve simultaneously information uncertainty
and conflicting goals. First, we develop an animal collective
decision-making model that is formulated with a view to
being as general and widely applicable as possible. Next,
we use the model to investigate the principal consequences
of different empirical decision-making strategies in ani-
mals (e.g., decision sharing, unshared decision making;
Conradt and Roper 2005) with respect to (1) decision
errors (i.e., decision accuracy) and (2) individual decision
gains. Finally, on the basis of the model results, we make
predictions about adaptive strategies of animals in collec-
tive decisions in different environments. We discuss our
results including a (tentative) view to human collective
decision making.
Methods: The Model
In order to make the model widely applicable, we consider
animal collective decisions with a typical conflict structure
for noneusocial species, namely that of large-scale goal
agreement in conjunction with small-scale goal conflict
(box 1).
Brief Model Summary
We consider a decision between two mutually exclusive
decision options. In accordance with relevant animal de-
cisions (box 1), we assume that all animals have the same
large-scale goal to decide in favor of a productive option,
but there is goal conflict between animals with respect to
smaller-scale feature(s) of the options (conflicting goals).
In our model, these large- and small-scale goals are re-
flected in the gains that different animals can achieve from
a given decision outcome. Additionally, we assume that
animals have only uncertain personal information about
the productivity state of either option (information
uncertainty).
We consider the following potential decision-making
strategies (based on observed decision-making strategies
in animals; for a review, see Conradt and Roper 2005).
First, an animal makes an individual decision on the basis
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of either an uninformed or an informed personal choice.
Second, a number of animals make the decision by fol-
lowing/being a dictator/leader. Third, a number of animals
share the decision. In a shared decision, the number of
decision makers can vary, and decision makers can be
either homogeneous or diverse with respect to their small-
scale goals. We use the model to predict for each potential
decision-making strategy (1) the likelihood of a large-scale
decision error (i.e., the decision accuracy) and (2) the
expected decision gains to different animals.
Decision Options
We assume that a group of animals is making a decision
between two mutually exclusive options A and B. These
two options could be, for example, two migration routes,
two foraging patches, or two communal activities. We fur-
ther assume that each of the two options can be in one
of two states (independent of the state of the other option):
it can be either productive or unproductive with respect
to the communal large-scale goal of all group members
(box 1). Here, the term “productive” is to be understood
in a very broad and general sense; for example, a migration
route is productive if it leads to the desired communal
migration destination, a foraging patch is productive if it
yields food, an activity is productive if it leads to success
of the communal enterprise, and so on (Clutton-Brock et
al. 1982; Packer and Ruttan 1988; Boesch 1994; Creel and
Creel 1995; Nagy et al. 2010; McComb et al. 2011). We
define the probability that option A is productive as prodA
and the probability that option B is productive as prodB.
In order not to bias the situation, we assume for this
purpose that these probabilities are equal (i.e., prodA p
prodB p prod; table 1).
Conflict Structure
Large-Scale Goal Agreement. On the basis of the typical
conflict structure in relevant animal decisions (box 1), we
assume that there is general goal agreement with respect to
the crucial large-scale state of the environment (termed
“productivity”), so that all animals prefer a productive to
an unproductive option. Large-scale goal agreement is typ-
ical formembers of stable groups since they would otherwise
not live socially (Clutton-Brock et al. 1982; Creel and Creel
1995; Krause and Ruxton 2002; Biro et al. 2006; Nagy et
al. 2010; McComb et al. 2011; see also box 1). Large-scale
goal agreement also occurs frequently in more open groups
in fission-fusion societies (Kerth et al. 2006; Sueur et al.
2011; see also “Fission-Fusion Societies” in app. B). Here,
we do not explore situations where there is no large-scale
goal agreement, because these are not typical for stable
groups and in such situations there is, in principal, no ad-
vantage in information sharing. These situations are, there-
fore, already covered by existing models that deal with con-
flict alone (for a review, see Conradt 2012).
Small-Scale Goal Conflict. Further, we assume that there
is small-scale goal conflict between at least some individ-
uals (box 1). That is, we assume that options A and B
differ with respect to some (smaller-scale) feature(s) (e.g.,
route safety vs. length, food quality vs. quantity, activity
risk vs. expenditure: Clutton-Brock et al. 1982; Packer and
Ruttan 1988; Krause et al. 1992; Biro et al. 2006; King et
al. 2008; Lingle et al. 2008; Nagy et al. 2010; note that in
a two-option decision, the detailed structure of the small-
scale feature[s] is not relevant). We further assume that
individuals differ in their goals with respect to the small-
scale feature(s), so that if both options are productive,
then some animals prefer option A (A-animals) and others
option B (B-animals).
Individual Gains
The described large-scale goal agreement and small-scale
goal conflict are reflected in the potential gains (payoffs)
to individuals resulting from different decision outcomes
(table 1). If the decision outcome is in favor of an un-
productive option, no animal gains benefits (large-scale
error). If the decision outcome is in favor of a productive
option, then all animals gain at least one unit of benefits
(large-scale goal is achieved). If this decision outcome is
option A, and if option A is productive, then animals with
a small-scale goal preference for option A (A-animals)
additionally gain g ( ) units of benefit. Vice versa, ifg 1 0
the decision outcome is option B, and if option B is pro-
ductive, then animals with a small-scale goal preference
for option B (B-animals) additionally gain g units of ben-
efit. These extra gains g reflect the degree of small-scale
goal conflict between A- and B-animals: a small g implies
a low small-scale conflict, and a high g implies a high
small-scale conflict. Since large-scale goals are generally
more important than small-scale goals (Clutton-Brock et
al. 1982; Krause and Ruxton 2002), we assume that g !
. We are interested in the standardized individual gains1
(i.e., the ratio of expected gains to maximally possible
gains). These are as follows for an A-animal (for details
of derivation, see “Individual Gains” in app. A):
gains to A-animalp
2{prod [1! P (A , B )g]outcome prod prodA
! prod(1" prod)P (A , B )(1! g) (1)outcome prod unprodA
! (1" prod)prod[1" P (A , B )]}outcome unprod prodA
/[prod(1! g)! (1" prod)prod],
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Table 2: List of candidate strategies and their implications for the decision outcome
Candidate strategies
Probability that the decision outcome is in favorPoutcomeA
of option Aa if the true states of productivity areb
Aprod ! Bprod Aprod ! Bunprod Aunprod ! Bprod
S1: random decision .5 .5 .5
S2: individual decision (A-animal):
S2a: uninformed personal choice 1 1 1
S2b: informed personal choice 1 " (1 " q)q 1 " (1 " q)2 1 " q2
S2′: individual decision (B-animal):
S2′a: uninformed personal choice 0 0 0
S2′b: informed personal choice q(1 " q) q2 (1 " q)2
S3: dictator (A-animal):
S3a: uninformed personal choice 1 1 1
S3b: informed personal choice 1 " (1 " q)q 1 " (1 " q)2 1 " q2
S3′: dictator (B-animal):
S3′a: uninformed personal choice 0 0 0
S3′b: informed personal choice q(1 " q) q2 (1 " q)2
S4: Shared decision making:c
S4a: uninformed personal choice 1 if nA 1 nB,
0 if nA ! nB
1 if nA 1 nB,
0 if nA ! nB
1 if nA 1 nB,
0 if nA ! nB
S4b: informed personal choice dn nA B n i n "i j n "jnA BA B! ! P (A) (1" P (A)) P (A) (1" P (A))A A B B[( ) ( ) ]i jipmax [0, (n!1)/2"n ] jpmax [0, (n!1)/2"i]B
S4c: majority makes informed personal
choice/minority makes
uninformed personal choicee PA(A
(n!1)/2)d
5: Condorcet juryf dn n i n "iA! P (U) (1" P (U))A A[( ) ]iip(n!1)/2
a Probability that the decision outcome is in favor of option B is .P p 1" Poutcome outcomeB A
b Aprod/Aunprod p option A is productive/unproductive; Bprod/Bunprod p option B is productive/unproductive.
c Set of decision makers: nA, A-animals; nB, B-animals. Number of decision makers: . Diversity: .
2np n ! n divp 4n n /nA B A B
d PA(A), PA(B), and PA(U) are the probabilities that the informed personal choice of an A-animal, B-animal, and unbiased animal, respectively, is option A.
PA(A), PA(B), and PA(U) depend on the true productivity state of either option and on the information reliability q. Their various values are given in table 1.
e A majority of decision makers of !1 is assumed, and the value is given for a situation in which the majority are A-animals (i.e., andn p (n! 1)/2A
.n p (n" 1)/2)B
f Set of n unbiased decision makers. This strategy is not available to animals in a conflict situation and is for comparison only.
whereby the ’s are the probabilities that the decisionPoutcomeA
outcome is in favor of option A, depending on the true
productivity states of both options (Aprod/Aunprod and Bprod/
Bunprod) and on the decision-making strategy (see below;
table 2).
Information Uncertainty
Since decisions usually involve uncertainty (Krause et al.
2010), we assume that each animal has only imperfect
personal information about the productivity state of either
option, so that an individual animal privately judges the
productivity state of an option correctly with probability
q. We term this the animal’s information reliability q. The
probability that an animal judges correctly is assumed to
be greater than chance (i.e., ) but less than certainq 1 0.5
(i.e., ). For the present purpose, we assumed that allq ! 1
individuals have the same information reliability q. Thus,
an animal judges the true productivity state of both op-
tions correctly with probability q2 (table 1). The size of q
also represents the uncertainty/predictability of the envi-
ronment: if q is small, the environment has high uncer-
tainty; if q is large, the environment is very predictable.
Personal Choices
Before animals can make collective decisions by aggre-
gating choices, they first have to establish their own per-
sonal choice. In this setting, there are exactly two adaptive
candidate heuristics for an animal with small-scale goals
to make a personal (i.e., individual, noncollective) choice
between options A and B (for detailed arguments, see
“Personal Choice” in app. B), which we both consider.
One candidate heuristic is to ignore all personal infor-
mation about the large-scale states of the options and to
always choose the option with the preferred small-scale
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Figure 1: Risk of large-scale error as a function of the number of decision makers (for clarity, scaling of the vertical axis differs between
panels). Black lines, sets of decision makers consist of A- and B-animals with a common large-scale goal but conflicting small-scale goals.
The decision makers are either homogeneous with respect to small-scale goals (dashed lines, all decision makers have the same small-scale
goal; div p 0), medium diverse (dotted lines, approximately three-fourths of decision makers have one small-scale goal and one-fourth
the other; div p 0.75; ), or maximally diverse (solid lines, approximately one-half of decision makers are A-individuals andn ! n ≥ 3A B
one-half are B-individuals; div p 1; ; see fig. 2). Gray solid lines, sets of unbiased decision makers without small-scale goalsn ! n ≥ 3A B
(Condorcet juries, given for reasons of comparison). Individual information reliability: (a), (b), (c), (d).qp 0.6 qp 0.7 qp 0.8 qp 0.9
feature(s) (uninformed personal choice; i.e., an A-animal’s
personal choice is always option A, a B-animal’s option
B). The other candidate heuristic is to choose the option
with the preferred small-scale feature(s) unless the animal
believes that that option is unproductive and, at the same
time, that the other option is productive (in which case,
the animal chooses the other option; informed personal
choice; table 1; note that these are the only two candidate
heuristics for making an adaptive personal choice; for de-
tails, see “Personal Choice” in app. B).
For reasons of comparison only, we also consider the
choice that an animal would make that has no small-scale
goal preferences (an unbiased animal). If an unbiased an-
imal believes that either both options or none are pro-
ductive, it makes a random personal choice; otherwise, it
makes (an informed) personal choice in favor of the option
that it believes to be productive (table 1).
Candidate Decision-Making Strategies
We are deliberately not looking for an abstract optimal
decision-making strategy, since it is highly unlikely that
animals have the cognitive and rational abilities to find
and implement an optimal strategy, and an optimal strat-
egy (outside of the range of observed or basic strategies)
would therefore be unrealistic (bounded rationality; Gige-
renzer and Goldstein 1996). Instead, it is reasonable to
assume that animals always use, from a range of feasible
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Figure 2: Risk of large-scale error as a function of diversity of decision makers (for clarity, scaling of the vertical axis differs between panels).
Dotted lines, seven decision makers; dashed lines, 19 decision makers; solid lines, 51 decision makers. Individual information reliability
ranges from low to high: (a), (b), (c), (d).qp 0.6 qp 0.7 qp 0.8 qp 0.9
strategies, the strategy that is most appropriate in a given
situation. Consequently, we investigate a comprehensive
range of observed animal decision-making strategies as
candidate strategies and then ask which of those strategies
does best in a given situation (for more details, see “Shared
Decisions: Aggregation of Personal Choices into a Collec-
tive Choice” in app. A). Candidate strategies to decide
between options A and B are as follows:
Strategy 1 (S1): as a baseline, we consider a random
decision between options.
Strategy 2 (S2): an animal makes the decision individ-
ually so that the decision is its own personal choice (in-
dividual decision; table 2; for the present purpose, we ig-
nore restrictions imposed by the necessity for group
cohesion; Kerth 2010).
Strategy 3 (S3): the animal follows (or is) a dictator/
leader. The decision outcome is the dictator’s personal
choice (Ramseyer 2009).
Strategy 4 (S4): the group makes a shared decision
whereby a subset of group members (the decision makers)
make the decision by majority vote, on the basis of the
decision makers’ personal choices (which can be informed
or uninformed; see above), and all group members accept
the decision outcome (consensus decision; Conradt and
Roper 2003, 2005; for details of shared decisions and de-
cision makers, see “Shared Decisions: Aggregation of Per-
sonal Choices into a Collective Choice”). To ensure gen-
erality, we cover the possible and empirically observed
range of the number and composition of decision makers,
from dictatorial to equally shared decisions (Conradt and
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Figure 3: Decision accuracy for different decision-making strategies. Strategy coding (from left to right) as follows. Solid black bars, random
decision (S1)/uninformed individual decision (S2a)/uninformed dictatorial decision (S3a)/majority makes uninformed shared decision (S4a).
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Solid dark gray bars, informed individual decision (S2b)/informed dictatorial decision (S3b). Thin black right-striped bars, informed shared
decision by a small, homogeneous set of decision makers (div p 0, n p 7; S4.I). Thin black left-striped bars, informed shared decision
by a large, homogeneous set of decision makers (div p 0, n p 51; S4.I). Thick black right-striped bars, informed shared decision by a
small, maximally diverse set of decision makers (div p 1, n p 7; S4.II). Thick black left-striped bars, informed shared decision by a large,
maximally diverse set of decision makers (div p 1, n p 51; S4.II). Thick gray right-striped bars, informed shared decision by a small,
medium-diverse set of decision makers (div p 0.75, n p 7; S4.III). Thick gray left-striped bars, informed shared decision by a large,
medium-diverse set of decision makers (div p 0.75, n p 51; S4.III). Large checkered bars, shared decision whereby the majority makes
informed personal choice and the minority makes uninformed personal choice (small set of decision makers, FnA " nBFp 1, np 7; S4c).
Small checkered bars, shared decision whereby the majority makes informed personal choice and the minority makes uninformed personal
choice (large set of decision makers, FnA " nBF p 1, n p 51; S4c). For comparison only: sparsely dotted bars, informed shared decision
by a small Condorcet jury (np 7; S5). Dotted bars, informed shared decision by a large Condorcet jury (np 51; S5). Individual information
reliability: q p 0.6 (a), q p 0.7 (b), q p 0.8 (c), q p 0.9 (d).
Roper 2005; Kerth et al. 2006; King et al. 2008; Petit et
al. 2009). Decision makers can be diverse with respect to
small-scale goals. Thus, we define a variable div that mea-
sures the diversity with respect to small-scale goals between
decision makers (see “Shared Decisions: Aggregation of
Personal Choices into a Collective Choice”) and three sub-
strategies:
Substrategy S4.I: shared decisions by decision makers
that are homogeneous with respect to small-scale goals.
Substrategy S4.II: shared decisions by decision makers
that are maximally diverse with respect to small-scale goals.
Substrategy S4.III: shared decisions by decision makers
that are medium diverse with respect to small-scale goals.
Strategy 5 (S5): for reasons of comparison, we also con-
sider the shared decision that a set of hypothetical, un-
biased decision makers (see above) would make, since this
is equivalent to the decision by a Condorcet jury (here a
set of decision makers that have no small-scale goals).
Depending on the decision-making strategy, we calcu-
late the likelihood that the decision outcome is in favor
of option A (or option B, respectively; table 2; for more
details, see “Shared Decisions: Aggregation of Personal
Choices into a Collective Choice”).
Risk of a Large-Scale Error and Decision Accuracy
The worst error that a group of animals can make is to
decide in favor of an unproductive option when a pro-
ductive option is available (large-scale error; e.g., a deci-
sion in favor of a migration route that does not lead to a
viable destination, a decision in favor of a foraging patch
that does not contain food, a decision in favor of a com-
munal activity that is not successful; box 1), so that the
gains are zero to all animals (table 1). Such a large-scale
error arises if either (1) option A is productive, option B
is unproductive, and the decision outcome is in favor of
option B; or (2) option A is unproductive, option B is
productive, and the decision outcome is in favor of option
A. Thus, when a large-scale error is possible, the condi-
tional risk of such a large-scale error, , is asPlarge-scale error
follows:
P plarge-scale error
{prod(1" prod)[1" P (A , B )]outcome prod unprodA
! (1" prod)prod# P (A , B )} (2)outcome unprod prodA
/[2prod(1" prod)]
[1" P (A , B )]! P (A , B )outcome prod unprod outcome unprod prodA Ap ,
2
whereby andP (A , B ) P (A , B )outcome prod unprod outcome unprod prodA A
are the probabilities that the decision outcome is in favor
of option A, depending on the decision-making strategy
and the true productivity states of either option. They are
given in table 2. Accordingly, we define the decision ac-
curacy as
accuracyp 1" P . (3)large-scale error
Parameter Space
We have covered the parameter space extensively and in-
vestigated the influence of productivity, gains (pdegree
of conflict), information reliability, and diversity across
the whole parameter ranges (prod, g: 0.05–0.95; q: 0.51–
0.99; div: 0–1), a wide range of number of decision makers
(n: 3–101; note that 101 is very large for most relevant
noneusocial animal species), and the possible combina-
tions of these parameters. For brevity and clarity, we pro-
vide results for only the combination of a restricted num-
ber of representative parameter values (e.g., low/high
productivity# low/high conflict# low/high information
reliability # low/high diversity # small/large number of
decision makers). These parameter values capture all the
qualitative results of our model.
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Results
Decision Accuracy
In a shared decision, the risk of a large-scale error is lower
than a random error (0.5) and decreases with the number
of decision makers, unless information reliability and de-
cision maker diversity is relatively low (fig. 1). Thus, shared
decisions (strategy 4) usually lead to fewer large-scale er-
rors than do random decisions (strategy 1), individual
decisions based on personal choice (strategy 2), or deci-
sions made by following a dictator/leader (strategy 3). Fur-
ther, the risk of large-scale error always decreases with the
diversity of decision makers div, independent of number
of decision makers n, and reliability of information q (fig.
2). Thus, our model results suggest that large-scale errors
are reduced (and thus decision accuracy is enhanced) if
decisions are shared as widely as possible among animals
that are both diverse and well balanced with respect to
their small-scale goals.
Consequently, the best decision-making strategy with
respect to decision accuracy—of all the considered strat-
egies—is a shared decision by decision makers that are
maximally diverse with respect to their small-scale goals
and are, at the same time, as numerous as possible (fig.
3, S4.II, , thick black left-striped bars). Moreover,np 51
such diverse groups can achieve higher decision accuracy
than comparable groups without goal conflicts (strategy
5: Condorcet juries; fig. 3, S5, , sparsely dottednp 51
bars). This result directly contradicts the intuition that
conflicts hinder efficient information pooling.
If decision makers all have the same small-scale goal
and if individual judgement reliability is at most moderate,
then the risk of a large-scale error not only is relatively
high but also can even increase with the number of de-
cision makers (fig. 1a, 1b, dashed line; fig. 1a, dotted line).
This is because as judgement reliability drops, personal
biases become more crucial, and animals with a similar
small-scale goal are likely to err in their choice in similar
situations. For example, A-animals are most likely to err
when option A is unproductive, while B-animals are most
likely to err when option B is unproductive. Consequently,
choice errors of animals with similar small-scale goals are
likely to be correlated even when individual judgements
per se are independent of each other. Such correlations
undermine the information pooling benefits that are sug-
gested by Condorcet’s classic jury theorem. To conclude,
if animals have preferences over large-scale goals as well
as smaller-scale goals, then excluding particular factions
from decision making (e.g., those animals whose small-
scale goals are in the minority) can result in less accurate
decision outcomes for all group members.
Individual Decision Gains
Decision gains to individuals are crucial for the evolution
of decision-making strategies. While avoiding decision er-
rors is in the interest of all animals, individual fitness is
the ultimate driving force in the evolution of collective
decision-making strategies (Conradt and Roper 2003;
Rands et al. 2003), and individual fitness is likely to be
related to individual gains (Maynard Smith 1979).
We found that decision gains to a focal animal depend
crucially on the number and diversity of decision makers
and the interaction of those two factors. If diversity of
decision makers is high with respect to small-scale goals,
decision gains to a focal animal increase (and then plateau)
with the number of decision makers (fig. 4, solid black
lines). This is due to the advantages of information pooling
by diverse decision makers (fig. 1, solid black lines). In
such situations, it is better for a (selfish) animal to share
decisions with others (strategy 4) than to make decisions
randomly (strategy 1) or individually (strategy 2) or to
follow a dictator/leader (strategy 3).
However, the situation is different if decision makers
are not diverse. If productivity and conflict are both high
and a distinct majority of decision makers have the op-
posite small-scale goal of that of the focal animal, then
the gains to a focal animal decrease with the number of
decision makers (fig. 4d, 4h, gray lines) for the following
reason. At high productivity, often both options are pro-
ductive so that the advantages of informed choices and
information pooling are relatively small. Moreover, when
both options are productive at the same time, an increas-
ingly large majority of decision makers with opposite
small-scale goal preferences is increasingly likely to decide
in favor of the focal animal’s less preferred option. There-
fore, the focal animal loses out on extra gains, particularly
if those extra gains are large and the disadvantages of
conflict are high. Consequently, conflict disadvantages out-
weigh information-pooling advantages. Finally, if diversity
is low and information reliability is also low, gains to a
focal animal usually decrease with the number of decision
makers (fig. 4a–4d). This is due to the above-mentioned
disadvantages of error pooling by large numbers of sim-
ilarly biased decision makers (fig. 1a, dotted lines).
Thus, goal diversity is important for decision gains. So
much so that decision gains to a focal individual often
peak when the decision makers include a considerable
proportion of animals with opposite (conflicting) small-
scale goal preferences and decision makers are diverse and
relatively balanced with respect to individual small-scale
goals (fig. 5a–5c, 5e–5g). This is particularly so when pro-
ductivity, information reliability, and conflict costs (i.e.,
extra gains) are low or the number of decision makers is
large (fig. 5).
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Figure 4: Standardized decision gains for an A-animal as a function of the number of decision makers (for clarity, scaling of the vertical
axis differs between panels). Proportion of decision makers that are A-animals: (dotted gray lines; div p 0),prop p 0 prop p 0.25A A
(dashed gray lines; divp 0.75), (solid black lines; divp 1), (dashed black lines; divp 0.75), (dottedprop p 0.5 prop p 0.75 prop p 1A A A
black lines; div p 0). Productivity: low, prod p 0.1 (a, b, e, f); high, prod p 0.9 (c, d, g, h). Extra gains (indicative of degree of small-
scale conflict): low, (a, c, e, g); high, (b, d, f, h). Information reliability: low, (a–d); high, (e, f).gp 0.1 gp 0.9 qp 0.6 qp 0.9
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Figure 5: Standardized individual decision gains for A-animals as a function of the proportion of A-animals in the set of decision makers
(nA/(nA ! nB); for clarity, scaling of the vertical axis differs between panels). The individual panels give results for different parameter com-
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binations (small/large number of decision makers # low/high degree of conflict # low/high level of productivity), and the different lines
indicate different levels of information reliability. In each panel, the diversity of decision makers is highest when the proportion of A-
animals p proportion of B-animals p 0.5 (i.e., in the middle of each X-axis). When the curves of gains peak at around a proportion of
A-animals p 0.5, then the gains peak at around highest diversity of decision makers. This is the case if productivity is low or the number
of decision makers is large (a, b, e–g). If the curves of gains peak at a higher proportion of A-animals (here, around 0.75), then gains peak
at medium diversity among decision makers with a bias toward A-animals (here, approximately three A-animals to one B-animal). This is
the case if productivity is high and the number of decision makers is small (c, d) or if conflict, productivity, and number of decision makers
are simultaneously high (h). The differences between levels of information reliability within each situation (i.e., within each panel) were
largely quantitative rather than qualitative. Information reliability: low, q p 0.6 (solid black lines); low-medium, q p 0.7 (dashed black
lines); medium-high, q p 0.8 (solid gray lines); high, q p 0.9 (dashed gray lines). Productivity: low, prodp 0.1 (a, b, e, f); high, prodp
0.9 (c, d, g, h). Extra gains (indicative of degree of small-scale conflict): low, g p 0.1 (a, c, e, g); high, g p 0.9 (b, d, f, h). Number of
decision makers: small, n p 7 (a–d); large, n p 51 (e, f).
Therefore, a relatively balanced and diverse mixture of
decision makers with different small-scale goals is often
of greater advantage to any individual than is a decision
in which all decision makers have the same small-scale
goals as the individual itself (i.e., there is no conflict).
Consequently, the best decision-making strategy for all
stakeholders (in terms of decision gains) is often a shared
decision by a large number of maximally diverse decision
makers, particularly in relatively unproductive and/or un-
predictable environments (fig. 6a–6c, 6e, S4.II, n large).
Even when this is not the best strategy, the next best strat-
egy is usually also a widely shared decision by at least
medium-diverse decision makers (fig. 6d, 6f). Only if the
environment is very productive and predictable is a de-
cision strategy by a set of homogeneous, like-minded (with
respect to small-scale goals) individuals of advantage to
an animal (fig. 6g, 6h). However, in this case, the best
strategy for A-animals is not good for B-animals (fig. 6g,
6h; compare strategies “S4.I: Homogenous, A” and “S4.I:
Homogeneous, B”). Here, which strategy ultimately
evolves will depend on additional factors (such as the need
for group cohesion; Conradt and Roper 2007, 2009).
In all environments, individual (unshared) decision-
making strategies (S2 and S3) yielded generally lower de-
cision gains than did at least some of the shared strategies
(fig. 6). However, additional factors (such as differences
in individual expertise) could change this result. Also re-
markable is the fact that in all environments, Condorcet
juries (i.e., decisions by unbiased decision makers; strategy
S5) yielded lower decision gains than did at least one of
the shared decision-making strategies by biased decision
makers (i.e., A- and B-animals; fig. 6).
In conclusion, we suggest that once diverse groups arise,
selection will often favor a relatively large and diverse set
of decision makers (strategy 4.II). Selection for diversity
will also depend on the environmental productivity and
predictability.
Discussion
Intuitively, when there is conflict, one might expect that a
decision made dictatorially by the animal itself—or at least
by like-minded individuals with the same goal—is of ad-
vantage to an animal in terms of its ultimate decision gains.
However, our results suggest otherwise: individual decision
gains often peak when there are several decision makers,
and these decisionmakers include a considerable proportion
of animals with opposite (conflicting) small-scale goal pref-
erences of that of the focal individual. This is particularly
so in unproductive and uncertain environments.
The underlying mechanism is a fundamental and gen-
eral one: animals with conflicting goals make decision
choice errors more independently, so that those errors
more frequently cancel out. Thus, a large, balanced, and
diverse mixture of decision makers with different (con-
flicting) small-scale goals is often best, even from the point
of view of a selfish animal. This suggests that conflict, far
from hampering information pooling and effective deci-
sion making, can even improve the situation for all stake-
holders, as long as they share large-scale goals. Thus, it
provides a strong argument in the interest of all stake-
holders for including other (e.g., minority) factions in col-
lective decisions.
Benefits of diversity to collective decision making have
been reported in house sparrows and humans (Sunstein
2002; Jarzabkowski and Searle 2004; Page 2007; Liker and
Bukony 2009). In those cases, diversity relates to a dis-
tinctly different notion as discussed here, namely to dif-
ferences in problem-solving strategies between individuals.
Our results add a new dimension: they suggest that di-
versity in goals (even in connection with exactly the same
problem-solving strategy) can have additional benefits for
decision outcomes in terms of accuracy and gains. The
reason is that diversity in small-scale goals leads to adaptive
but biased personal choices. The consequence of these
biases is that animals with different goals are principally
less likely to be correlated in their decision errors than are
animals with similar goals, thus enabling better compen-
sation of individual errors (Codling et al. 2007; List et al.
2009; Krause et al. 2010; Ward et al. 2011). To our knowl-
edge, this principle has not been suggested before.
Some social animals live in more open societies (fission-
fusion societies; Kerth et al. 2006; Sueur et al. 2011), in
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Figure 6: Standardized expected decision gains to an A-animal for different decision-making strategies (note that the decision gains to B-
animals are symmetric and can be deduced by looking at the respective alternative strategies in which the number of A- and B-animals as
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decision makers is reversed). Strategy coding (from left to right) as follows. Individual decision-making strategies: solid black bars, uninformed
individual/dictatorial decision by an A-animal (S2a/S3a). Solid light gray bars, uninformed dictatorial decision by a B-animal (S3a). Solid
dark gray bars, informed individual/dictatorial decision by an A-animal (S2b/S3b). Solid medium gray bars, informed dictatorial decision
by a B-animal (3b). Shared decision-making strategies, small set of decision makers (n p 7): thin black right-striped bars, homogeneous
set of decision makers consisting of A-animals (div p 0, propA p 1; S4.I). Medium-thick black right-striped bars, medium-diverse set of
decision makers, majority are A-animals (div ≈ 0.75, propAp 5/7; S4.III). Thick black right-striped bars, maximally diverse set of decision
makers, majority are A-animals (div ≈ 1, propA p 4/7; S4.II). Thick black left-striped bars, maximally diverse set of decision makers,
majority are B-animals (div ≈ 1, propAp 3/7; S4.II). Medium-thick black left-striped bars, medium-diverse set of decision makers, majority
are B-animals (div ≈ 0.75, propA p 2/7; S4.III). Thin black left-striped bars, homogeneous set of decision makers consisting of B-animals
(divp 0, propAp 0; S4.I). Shared decision-making strategies, large set of decisionmakers (np 51): thin gray right-striped bars, homogeneous
set of decision makers consisting of A-animals (div p 0, propA p 1; S4.I). Medium-thick gray right-striped bars, medium-diverse set of
decision makers, majority are A-animals (div ≈ 0.75, propAp 38/51; S4.III). Thick gray right-striped bars, maximally diverse set of decision
makers, majority are A-animals (div ≈ 1, propA p 26/51; S4.II). Thick gray left-striped bars, maximally diverse set of decision makers,
majority are B-animals (div ≈ 1, propA p 25/51; S4.II). Medium-thick gray left-striped bars, medium-diverse set of decision makers,
majority are B-animals (div ≈ 0.75, propA p 13/51; S4.III). Thin gray left-striped bars, homogeneous set of decision makers consisting of
B-animals (div p 0, propA p 0; S4.I). For comparison: densely dotted bars, random decision (S1). Dotted bars, informed decision by an
unbiased animal (S5). White bars, small Condorcet jury (n p 7; S5). Sparsely dotted bars, large Condorcet jury (n p 51; S5). Individual
information reliability: low, q p 0.6 (a–d); high, q p 0.9 (e–h). Productivity: low, p p 0.1 (a, b, e, f); high, p p 0.9 (c, d, g, h). Extra
gains (pdegree of small-scale conflict): low, g p 0.1 (a, c, e, g); high, g p 0.9 (b, d, f, h).
which our assumption that the gains from large-scale goals
exceed those from small-scale goals might sometimes not
hold. In environments with relatively low conflict, low
productivity, high uncertainty, or high population density,
the results of our model also apply to animals in such
fission-fusion societies (for detailed arguments, see “Fis-
sion-Fusion Societies” in app. B). However, if conflict is
high, and as the productivity of the environment and the
certainty increase, it becomes increasingly more beneficial
for animals in fission-fusion societies to segregate into
homogeneous subgroups with similar small-scale goals.
While a huge body of research in a wide range of dis-
ciplines looks at collective decisions in situations with in-
formation uncertainty (e.g., Couzin et al. 2005, 2011) or
in situations with conflicting goals (e.g., Conradt and
Roper 2003, 2005), surprisingly few studies have looked
at both factors concurrently (Schulte 2010). There appears
to be no study in biology (i.e., behavioral ecology) that
makes predictions about adaptive strategies in such situ-
ations (Conradt 2012). Of the few relevant studies in the
social sciences, not many ask predictive questions. For
example, studies in social psychology confirm that indi-
viduals reveal information differently in collective deci-
sions when they have conflicting goals and that strategies
can differ between individuals (De Dreu et al. 2008; Toma
and Butera 2009). However, these studies do not inves-
tigate the why. Therefore, they do not allow us to make
predictions about profitable (adaptive) strategies. On the
other hand, relevant studies in engineering onmulticriteria
decision making usually treat information finding and
conflict resolution as relatively independent (and, by def-
inition, cooperative) processes (Tsiporkova and Boeva
2006), thereby limiting the generality of their findings.
Finally, a number of studies in social choice theory that
make relevant predictions (Austen-Smith and Feddersen
2009; Schulte 2010) are restricted to a very specific sense
of conflicting goals (i.e., the avoidance of false positives
vs. false negatives).
Our results provide some first, testable predictions for
decision under uncertainty and conflict. In particular, we
predict the conditions under which groups of animals with
diverse (conflicting) small-scale goals will make more ac-
curate decisions and achieve larger gains than groups of
animals in which all animals have the same small-scale
goal. Further, we predict that decision accuracy and in-
dividual gains increase with the number of decisionmakers
if there is diversity in small-scale goals but not if decision
makers have the same small-scale goals and information
reliability of individuals is at most moderate.
Our study is mainly aimed at understanding collective
decision making in social animals. How far it can also be
applied to human collective decision making requires fur-
ther investigation. Social animals offer the possibility of
applying a simple systems approach: they allow us to ex-
plore fundamental principles of collective decision making
that involve uncertainties and conflict without having to
address at once the full complexity of human behavior
that arises through the use of language (Conradt and List
2009). Thus, our study might guide future questions and
hypotheses for human studies. In particular, our results
suggest that it might be profitable to examine the role of
minority factions in human collective decisions from a
novel point of view, as long as there are some large-scale
goals that are common to all stakeholders.
To conclude, surprisingly little is known about decision-
making strategies that (selfish) individuals are likely to
employ in collective decisions that simultaneously involve
uncertainty and conflicting goals (Conradt 2012). We hope
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that our study will encourage scientists to no longer skirt
the problem by treating uncertainties and conflict in col-
lective decision making separately and independently of
each other.
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APPENDIX A
Computation Details of Individual Gains, Choice
Aggregation, and Decision Outcome
Individual Gains
The expected individual gains depend on the true pro-
ductivity state of either option and the decision outcome.
With probability prod2, both options are productive, and
we define the probability that the decision outcome is
option A as . The probabilityP (A , B ) Poutcome prod prod outcomeA A
depends on the fact that both options are(A , B )prod prod
productive, on the consequent beliefs of animals (table 1),
and on the decision-making strategies of animals
(see below; table 2). Thus, with probability 2prod #
, both options are productive, the de-P (A , B )outcome prod prodA
cision outcome is in favor of option A, and an A-animal
gains units of benefits; with probability 21! g prod #
, the decision outcome is in favor[1" P (A , B )]outcome prod prodA
of option B, and the A-animal gains 1 unit of benefits.
The opposite is true for a B-animal. Similarly, with prob-
ability , option Aprod(1" prod)# P (A , B )outcome prod unprodA
is productive but option B is unproductive, the decision
outcome is in favor of option A, and an A-animal gains
units of benefits and a B-animal 1 unit of1! g
benefits. Finally, with probability (1" prod)prod# [1"
, option A is unproductive but op-P (A , B )]outcome unprod prodA
tion B is productive, the decision outcome is in favor of
option B, and an A-animal gains 1 unit of benefits and a
B-animal units of benefits. Thus, the expected gains1! g
to an A-animal are
2prod [1! P (A , B )g]outcome prod prodA
! prod(1" prod)P (A , B )(1! g)outcome prod unprodA
! (1" prod)prod[1" P (A , B )].outcome unprod prodA
We standardize these expected gains relative to the max-
imally possible gains as follows. With probability prod,
option A is productive, and an A-animal can maximally
gain ; with probability , only option1! g (1" prod)prod
B is productive, and an A-animal can maximally gain 1
(table 1). Thus, the maximally possible gains are
. The standardized ex-prod(1! g)! (1" prod)prod# 1
pected individual gains to an A-animal (i.e., the ratio of
expected gains to maximally possible gains) are thus as
follows:
gains to A-animalp
2{prod [1! P (A , B )g]outcome prod prodA
! prod(1" prod)P (A , B )(1! g) (A1a)outcome prod unprodA
! (1" prod)prod[1" P (A , B )]}outcome unprod prodA
/[prod(1! g)! (1" prod)prod].
Accordingly, the standardized expected individual gains to
a B-animal are as follows:
gains to B-animalp
2(prod {1! [1" P (A , B )]g}outcome prod prodA
! prod(1" prod)P (A , B ) (A1b)outcome prod unprodA
! (1" prod)prod[1" P (A , B )](1! g))outcome unprod prodA
/[prod(1! g)! (1" prod)prod].
Shared Decisions: Aggregation of Personal
Choices into a Collective Choice
Group living offers the possibility of sharing the decision
with other group members by aggregating personal choices
(Conradt and List 2009). We therefore consider a range
of different decision-sharing strategies (table 2). The range
of empirically observed choice aggregation rules in animal
collective decision making ranges from dictatorial deci-
sions—via decisions shared among a subset of groupmem-
bers—to decisions shared equally by all group members
(Prins 1996; Seeley and Buhrman 1999; Conradt and
Roper 2003, 2005; Biro et al. 2006; Kerth et al. 2006; King
et al. 2008; Petit et al. 2009; Ramseyer et al. 2009; Nagy
et al. 2010; McComb et al. 2011; Ward et al. 2011). Re-
flecting this, our model assumes majority decisions that
are restricted to a certain subset of group members (i.e.,
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the set of decision makers; Conradt and List 2009). That
is, each animal in the set of decision makers has a vote
(its personal choice), while animals outside the set have
none, and the majority of personal choices determines the
collective choice and, thereby, the decision outcome. The
number of animals in the set of decision makers n can
range from one to all group members ( , where1 ≤ n ≤ N
N is group size; for reasons of simplicity, n is assumed to
be odd), so that the model’s admissible aggregation rules
cover the range of observed animal aggregation rules re-
ported in the literature (i.e., from dictatorial to equally
shared; Conradt and Roper 2005). Since the model as-
sumes that all animals have small-scale goals (see “Meth-
ods: The Model”), the set of decision makers consists of
nA A-animals and nB B-animals ( ;n ! n p n 0 ≤ n ≤A B A
; ; NA, NB, number of A- and B-animals inN 0 ≤ n ≤ NA B B
the group, respectively). The proportion of A-animals
among the set of decision makers is thus .prop p n /nA A
It can range from 0 to 1. Additionally, we define the di-
versity div of decision makers with respect to small-scale
goals as . Diversity of decision makers div2divp 4n n /nA B
can range from 0 (i.e., decision makers are homogenous
with respect to small-scale goals, so that either prop pA
or ) to approximately 1 (i.e., decision makers0 prop p 1A
are maximally diverse with respect to small-scale goals,
and approximately half of decision makers are A-animals
and half are B-animals; ; note that nprop ≈ prop ≈ 0.5A B
is assumed to be odd). For comparison, we also consider
sets of unbiased decision makers that consist of animals
without small-scale goals (this is for comparison only,
since a conflict-free strategy is not available to the animals
in our model). The collective choice of the decision-mak-
ing group is the option that is the personal choice (vote)
of a majority of animals within the set of decision makers.
Probability of a Decision Outcome in Favor of
Option A versus B in a Shared Decision
Here we derive the probability of a decision outcome in
favor of option A for shared decisions. In a shared decision,
the decision outcome is determined by the majority of
personal choices by the n decision makers. Thus, the prob-
ability that the decision outcome is in favor ofPoutcomeA
option A is as follows:
P poutcomeA
n nA B
(A2)! !
ipmax [0, (n!1)/2"n ] jpmax [0, (n!1)/2"i]B
n nA B i n "i j n "jA BP (A) (1" P (A)) P (A) (1" P (A)) ,A A B B[( )( ) ]i j
whereby PA(A) and PA(B) are the probabilities that the
informed personal choice of an A-animal and of a B-
animal, respectively, is in favor of option A. The proba-
bilities PA(A) and PA(B) depend on the animal’s beliefs
about the large-scale state of the environment (i.e., about
the productivity of either option) and thus on the true
large-scale states themselves (table 2). Thus, takesPoutcomeA
the following values in different situations (using eq. [A2]
and the values for PA(A) and PA(B) that are given in table
2 for different productivity states).
Case 1: both options are productive:
P (A , B )poutcome prod prodA
n nA B
(A3)! !
ipmax [0, (n!1)/2"n ] jpmax [0, (n!1)/2"i]B
n nA B i!n "j n "i!jB A[1" (1" q)q] [(1" q)q] .{( )( ) }i j
Case 2: option A is productive, option B is unproductive:
P (A , B )poutcome prod unprodA
n nA B
(A4)! !
ipmax [0, (n!1)/2"n ] jpmax [0, (n!1)/2"i]B
n nA 2 i 2n "2i B 2j 2 n "jA B[1" (1" q) ] (1" q) q (1" q ) .{( ) ( ) }i j
Case 3: option A is unproductive, option B is productive:
P (A , B )poutcome unprod prodA
n nA B
(A5)! !
ipmax [0, (n!1)/2"n ] jpmax [0, (n!1)/2"i]B
n nA 2 i 2n "2i B 2j 2 n "jA B(1" q )q (1" q) [1" (1" q) ] .{( ) ( ) }i j
Case 4: if both options are unproductive, it is irrelevant
which option the group chooses.
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Meerkats are one of many species in which collective decisions can involve uncertainties and conflicts. Photograph credit: Kalahari Meerkat
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